مقایسهٔ روش‌ها

	Sanctions Effectiveness Analysis	Selectorate Theory Analysis
حوزه	International Relations	International Relations
خانواده	Process / pipeline	MCDM
سال پیدایش	2007	2003
پدیدآور	Gary Hufbauer, Jeffrey Schott, Kimberly Elliott & Barbara Oegg (HSE/HSEO dataset)	Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Alastair Smith, Randolph Siverson & James Morrow
نوع	Coding and statistical analysis of sanctions episodes and outcomes	Formal theory of leader survival and policy choice
منبع بنیادین	Hufbauer, G. C., Schott, J. J., Elliott, K. A., & Oegg, B. (2007). Economic Sanctions Reconsidered (3rd ed.). Washington, DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics.	Bueno de Mesquita, B., Smith, A., Siverson, R. M., & Morrow, J. D. (2003). The Logic of Political Survival. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
نام‌های دیگر	Economic Sanctions Analysis, Sanctions Success Analysis, Sanctions Outcome Analysis, Economic Statecraft Effectiveness	Selectorate Theory, Logic of Political Survival, Winning Coalition Analysis, Selectorate Model of Governance
مرتبط	3	3
خلاصه	Sanctions effectiveness analysis is the systematic study of when economic sanctions achieve their political goals. Anchored by the Hufbauer, Schott, Elliott, and Oegg dataset of sanctions episodes (Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, 3rd ed., 2007), it codes each case for its objectives, instruments, costs, and outcome, then analyzes which conditions — multilateral support, modest goals, target vulnerability — predict success. Because states choose when to impose sanctions and targets choose how to respond, the field is centrally concerned with the selection problems that complicate any simple verdict on whether sanctions 'work.'	Selectorate theory, developed by Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Alastair Smith, Randolph Siverson, and James Morrow in The Logic of Political Survival (2003), explains policy and foreign-policy behavior as a by-product of leaders' overriding goal: staying in power. Every leader depends on a winning coalition (W) drawn from a larger selectorate (S) of those with a say in choosing leaders. The relative size of W and S determines whether a leader buys loyalty with broad public goods or narrow private rewards — which in turn shapes growth, war, peace, and the survival of regimes.