مقایسهٔ روش‌ها

	Resource Curse Analysis	Rent-Seeking Analysis
حوزه	Political Economy	Political Economy
خانواده	Regression model	MCDM
سال پیدایش	2001	1967
پدیدآور	Jeffrey Sachs & Andrew Warner (growth); Michael Ross (democracy)	Gordon Tullock & Anne Krueger
نوع	Cross-country regression analysis of resource dependence	Formal model of political-economic waste
منبع بنیادین	Sachs, J. D., & Warner, A. M. (2001). Natural Resources and Economic Development: The Curse of Natural Resources. European Economic Review, 45(4-6), 827-838.	Tullock, G. (1967). The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft. Western Economic Journal, 5(3), 224-232.
نام‌های دیگر	Natural Resource Curse Analysis, Paradox of Plenty Analysis, Rentier State Analysis, Resource Dependence Regression	Rent-Seeking Theory, Tullock Rent-Seeking Analysis, Rent-Seeking Contest Model, Directly Unproductive Profit-Seeking
مرتبط	3	4
خلاصه	Resource curse analysis is the empirical study of the paradox that economies rich in natural resources — oil, gas, minerals — often grow more slowly, remain less democratic, and suffer more conflict than resource-poor economies. Jeffrey Sachs and Andrew Warner's influential work, summarized in their 2001 European Economic Review article, documented a robust negative cross-country correlation between resource dependence and economic growth. Michael Ross's 2001 World Politics article extended the logic to politics, showing statistically that oil wealth is associated with weaker democracy through rentier, repression, and modernization mechanisms. The workhorse method is a cross-country regression of growth or democracy on a measure of resource dependence with controls for the standard determinants of development.	Rent-seeking analysis is the political-economy framework for measuring the social waste created when individuals and firms spend real resources competing for artificially created rents — the extra income generated by monopoly grants, tariffs, licenses, quotas, and other government-conferred privileges — rather than producing new wealth. Gordon Tullock's 1967 article showed that the conventional Harberger triangle drastically understates the cost of monopoly and protection, because the rectangle of monopoly profit, far from being a mere transfer, becomes a prize that competitors will expend resources to capture. Anne Krueger named the activity 'rent-seeking' in 1974 and demonstrated its macroeconomic scale in regulated developing economies. The analysis models the competition for a rent as a contest and asks how much of the prize is dissipated in the struggle to win it.