مقایسهٔ روشها
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| حراج قیمت اول× | رقابت استاکلبرگ× | |
|---|---|---|
| حوزه | نظریه بازیها | نظریه بازیها |
| خانواده | Machine learning | Machine learning |
| سال پیدایش≠ | 1961 | 1934 |
| پدیدآور≠ | William Vickrey | Heinrich von Stackelberg |
| نوع | algorithm | algorithm |
| منبع بنیادین≠ | Vickrey, W. (1961). Counterspeculation, auctions, and competitive sealed bids. The Journal of Finance, 16(1), 8-37. DOI ↗ | von Stackelberg, H. (1934). Marktform und Gleichgewicht. Julius Springer. link ↗ |
| نامهای دیگر | FPSB, Sealed-Bid Auction, Bid-Equal-Price Auction | Quantity Leadership, Sequential Oligopoly, Stackelberg Equilibrium |
| مرتبط | 4 | 4 |
| خلاصه≠ | A first-price auction is a sealed-bid mechanism where all participants submit bids simultaneously without knowing others' bids. The highest bidder wins and pays their own bid (the price they offered). Systematically analyzed by William Vickrey in 1961, first-price auctions require bidders to balance between winning and profit, leading to strategic underbidding relative to true valuations in equilibrium. | Stackelberg Competition models sequential oligopolistic markets where one firm (the leader) commits to a quantity first, and other firms (followers) observe this choice and respond. Introduced by Heinrich von Stackelberg in 1934, the model captures first-mover advantage in quantity-setting competition. The resulting Stackelberg Equilibrium, found by backward induction, yields the leader higher profit than simultaneous (Cournot) competition. |
| ScholarGateمجموعهداده ↗ |
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