Divine Attributes and the Coherence of Theism

The analysis of the traditional attributes of God and of whether the concept of God they jointly define is internally consistent.

Definition

The inquiry into the meaning, individual coherence, and joint consistency of the attributes that classical theism ascribes to God.

Scope

This topic covers the philosophical analysis of attributes such as omnipotence, omniscience, perfect goodness, eternity, immutability, and necessity, the internal puzzles each raises, the tensions between them, and the dispute over whether classical theism describes a coherent being. It does not cover analogy and predication or the verificationist challenge, treated as separate topics.

Core questions

• Can omnipotence be defined without paradox, such as the stone too heavy to lift?
• Is divine foreknowledge compatible with human free will?
• Are eternity and immutability consistent with a God who acts and responds in time?
• Do the attributes form a coherent and jointly possible concept of God?

Key theories

Coherence of the divine attributes

Swinburne argues that, once each attribute is carefully defined — for example, omnipotence as the power to do whatever is logically possible — the divine attributes are individually intelligible and jointly consistent, so the concept of God is coherent.

Incoherence objections

Kenny presses puzzles such as the apparent conflict between omniscient foreknowledge and human freedom and between immutability and divine action, arguing that the classical attributes resist coherent joint specification.

History

Analysis of the divine attributes runs from Boethius's account of eternity and Aquinas's doctrine of divine simplicity through medieval debates over foreknowledge and freedom. Analytic philosophy of religion revived these in the late twentieth century, with Swinburne and Wierenga defending the coherence of theism and Kenny and others pressing incoherence objections, especially around omnipotence and foreknowledge.

Debates

Whether foreknowledge is compatible with free will

If God infallibly knows future actions, those actions may seem fixed in advance; defenders appeal to divine timelessness or Molinist middle knowledge, while critics such as Kenny argue the tension is unresolved.

How omnipotence should be defined

The stone paradox asks whether God can make a stone too heavy to lift; Swinburne and others reply that omnipotence covers only the logically possible, so inability to do the logically impossible is no limitation.

Key figures

• Boethius
• Thomas Aquinas
• Richard Swinburne
• Anthony Kenny
• Edward Wierenga
• Nelson Pike

Seminal works

• swinburne1977
• kenny1979
• wierenga1989

Frequently asked questions

What is the paradox of the stone?

It asks whether an omnipotent God can create a stone too heavy for God to lift; either answer seems to limit God's power. A common reply is that omnipotence extends only to the logically possible, and a stone an omnipotent being cannot lift is incoherent.

Why might foreknowledge threaten free will?

If God knew yesterday exactly what you will do tomorrow, and God cannot be mistaken, it can seem that your action is already settled and so not free; responses include placing God outside time or distinguishing certainty from necessity.