Võrdle meetodeid

	Lineaarne krüptoanalüüs	Diferentsiaalkrüptanalüüs	Küljekanalüüs
Valdkond	Krüptograafia	Krüptograafia	Krüptograafia
Perekond	Machine learning	Machine learning	Machine learning
Tekkeaasta	1993	1990	1996
Looja	Mitsuru Matsui	Eli Biham	Paul Kocher
Tüüp	linear approximation attack	statistical attack on block ciphers	physical side-channel exploitation
Algallikas	Matsui, M. (1993). Linear cryptanalysis method for DES cipher. In Advances in Cryptology - EUROCRYPT 1993, LNCS 765, pp. 386-397.	Biham, E., & Shamir, A. (1990). Differential cryptanalysis of DES-like cryptosystems. In Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO 1990, LNCS 537, pp. 2-21.	Kocher, P. C. (1996). Timing attacks on implementations of Diffie-Hellman, RSA, DSS, and other systems. In Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO 1996, LNCS 1109, pp. 104-113.
Rööpnimetused	linear attack, linear approximation, piling-up lemma	differential attack, differential path, differential probability	SCA, timing attack, power analysis, cache attack
Seotud	3	3	3
Kokkuvõte	Linear cryptanalysis is a known-plaintext attack that exploits linear approximations of a cipher's non-linear transformations to recover secret key bits. Introduced by Mitsuru Matsui in 1993, linear cryptanalysis provides practical attacks on ciphers like DES with computational complexity less than brute force. The technique analyzes statistical biases in how linear combinations of plaintext and ciphertext bits relate to key bits, enabling key recovery with reduced data requirements.	Differential cryptanalysis is a statistical attack technique on symmetric block ciphers that analyzes differences in inputs and outputs to recover secret keys. Introduced by Eli Biham and Adi Shamir in 1990, differential cryptanalysis was the first practical attack on DES that outperformed brute force search. The technique exploits non-random properties of cipher transformations by studying how small changes in plaintext propagate through the cipher rounds. Differential cryptanalysis has shaped cipher design for three decades.	Side-channel analysis is a family of attacks that exploit physical properties of cryptographic implementations (timing, power consumption, electromagnetic emissions, cache behavior) to recover secret keys. Introduced by Paul Kocher in 1996, side-channel attacks have repeatedly broken implementations of theoretically secure cryptosystems by leveraging unintended information leakage. Side-channel analysis has become a critical concern in cryptographic system design, requiring constant-time implementations and physical countermeasures.