Rent-Seeking Analysis
Rent-seeking analysis is the political-economy framework for measuring the social waste created when individuals and firms spend real resources competing for artificially created rents — the extra income generated by monopoly grants, tariffs, licenses, quotas, and other government-conferred privileges — rather than producing new wealth. Gordon Tullock's 1967 article showed that the conventional Harberger triangle drastically understates the cost of monopoly and protection, because the rectangle of monopoly profit, far from being a mere transfer, becomes a prize that competitors will expend resources to capture. Anne Krueger named the activity 'rent-seeking' in 1974 and demonstrated its macroeconomic scale in regulated developing economies. The analysis models the competition for a rent as a contest and asks how much of the prize is dissipated in the struggle to win it.
Registro de origen
Citas copiadas textualmente del registro de origen del método. No se infiere ninguna verificación a nivel de afirmación de ellas.
- Tullock, G. (1967). The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft. Western Economic Journal, 5(3), 224-232. · DOI 10.1111/j.1465-7295.1967.tb01923.x
- Krueger, A. O. (1974). The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society. American Economic Review, 64(3), 291-303. · URL
Afirmaciones curadas
Afirmaciones persistidas en el libro mayor de evidencia, cada una con su propia evaluación.
Esta vista no inventa una evaluación de afirmación si el libro mayor no tiene ninguna.
Métodos relacionados
Generado a partir del grafo de métodos y mostrado como relaciones sugeridas por la máquina; no se infiere ninguna afirmación de evidencia.