Comparar métodos

	Two-Level Game Analysis	Valor de Shapley
Campo	Political Science	Teoría de juegos
Familia	MCDM	Machine learning
Año de origen	1988	1953
Autor original	Robert D. Putnam	Lloyd Shapley
Tipo	Framework for analyzing international negotiation under domestic constraints	algorithm
Fuente seminal	Putnam, R. D. (1988). Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games. International Organization, 42(3), 427-460.	Shapley, L. S. (1953). A value for n-person games. In H. W. Kuhn & A. W. Tucker (Eds.), Contributions to the Theory of Games II (pp. 307-317). Princeton University Press.
Alias	Two-Level Games, Putnam Two-Level Game Framework, Win-Set Analysis, Double-Edged Diplomacy	Fair Division, Cooperative Game Solution, Dividend Vector
Relacionados	4	4
Resumen	Two-level game analysis is a framework introduced by Robert Putnam in 1988 for understanding how international negotiations are jointly shaped by bargaining between governments and the need to win domestic approval. A negotiator plays simultaneously at two tables: Level I, where states bargain over an agreement, and Level II, where that agreement must be ratified by domestic constituents. The key analytic device is the win-set — the set of Level I deals that could secure domestic ratification — and an agreement is possible only where the negotiating states' win-sets overlap.	The Shapley Value is a solution concept for coalition games that distributes total payoff fairly among players based on their marginal contributions to coalitions. Introduced by Lloyd Shapley in 1953, the Shapley Value is the unique payoff distribution that satisfies four intuitive axioms: efficiency (total payoff is distributed), symmetry (identical players receive equal payoff), null player (players contributing nothing receive nothing), and additivity across games.