Comparar métodos
Revisa los métodos seleccionados uno junto a otro; las filas que difieren aparecen resaltadas.
| Equilibrio Perfecto en Subjuegos× | Equilibrio de Nash× | |
|---|---|---|
| Campo | Teoría de juegos | Teoría de juegos |
| Familia | Machine learning | Machine learning |
| Año de origen≠ | 1965 | 1950 |
| Autor original≠ | Reinhard Selten | John Nash |
| Tipo | algorithm | algorithm |
| Fuente seminal≠ | Selten, R. (1965). Spieltheoretische Behandlung eines Oligopolmodells mit Nachfrageträgheit. Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft, 121, 301-324. link ↗ | Nash, J. F. (1950). Equilibrium points in N-person games. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 36(1), 48-49. DOI ↗ |
| Alias≠ | Backward Induction, Sequential Equilibrium, Extensive-Form Equilibrium | Lemke-Howson Equilibrium, Completely Labeled Pair |
| Relacionados | 4 | 4 |
| Resumen≠ | Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (SPE) is a refinement of Nash Equilibrium for sequential games, introduced by Reinhard Selten in 1965. It requires that strategy profiles constitute a Nash Equilibrium in every subgame, eliminating non-credible threats and incredible promises. Backward induction is the primary computational method for finding SPE in finite games. | Nash Equilibrium is a game-theoretic solution concept where no player can unilaterally deviate to improve their payoff. Formalized by John Nash in 1950, the Lemke-Howson algorithm computationally finds equilibria in bimatrix games by identifying completely labeled vertex pairs in the strategy polytopes. |
| ScholarGateConjunto de datos ↗ |
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