Comparar métodos
Revisa los métodos seleccionados uno junto a otro; las filas que difieren aparecen resaltadas.
| Competencia de Stackelberg× | Equilibrio Perfecto en Subjuegos× | |
|---|---|---|
| Campo | Teoría de juegos | Teoría de juegos |
| Familia | Machine learning | Machine learning |
| Año de origen≠ | 1934 | 1965 |
| Autor original≠ | Heinrich von Stackelberg | Reinhard Selten |
| Tipo | algorithm | algorithm |
| Fuente seminal≠ | von Stackelberg, H. (1934). Marktform und Gleichgewicht. Julius Springer. link ↗ | Selten, R. (1965). Spieltheoretische Behandlung eines Oligopolmodells mit Nachfrageträgheit. Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft, 121, 301-324. link ↗ |
| Alias | Quantity Leadership, Sequential Oligopoly, Stackelberg Equilibrium | Backward Induction, Sequential Equilibrium, Extensive-Form Equilibrium |
| Relacionados | 4 | 4 |
| Resumen≠ | Stackelberg Competition models sequential oligopolistic markets where one firm (the leader) commits to a quantity first, and other firms (followers) observe this choice and respond. Introduced by Heinrich von Stackelberg in 1934, the model captures first-mover advantage in quantity-setting competition. The resulting Stackelberg Equilibrium, found by backward induction, yields the leader higher profit than simultaneous (Cournot) competition. | Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (SPE) is a refinement of Nash Equilibrium for sequential games, introduced by Reinhard Selten in 1965. It requires that strategy profiles constitute a Nash Equilibrium in every subgame, eliminating non-credible threats and incredible promises. Backward induction is the primary computational method for finding SPE in finite games. |
| ScholarGateConjunto de datos ↗ |
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