Comparar métodos

	Competencia de Stackelberg	Equilibrio de Nash
Campo	Teoría de juegos	Teoría de juegos
Familia	Machine learning	Machine learning
Año de origen	1934	1950
Autor original	Heinrich von Stackelberg	John Nash
Tipo	algorithm	algorithm
Fuente seminal	von Stackelberg, H. (1934). Marktform und Gleichgewicht. Julius Springer.	Nash, J. F. (1950). Equilibrium points in N-person games. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 36(1), 48-49.
Alias	Quantity Leadership, Sequential Oligopoly, Stackelberg Equilibrium	Lemke-Howson Equilibrium, Completely Labeled Pair
Relacionados	4	4
Resumen	Stackelberg Competition models sequential oligopolistic markets where one firm (the leader) commits to a quantity first, and other firms (followers) observe this choice and respond. Introduced by Heinrich von Stackelberg in 1934, the model captures first-mover advantage in quantity-setting competition. The resulting Stackelberg Equilibrium, found by backward induction, yields the leader higher profit than simultaneous (Cournot) competition.	Nash Equilibrium is a game-theoretic solution concept where no player can unilaterally deviate to improve their payoff. Formalized by John Nash in 1950, the Lemke-Howson algorithm computationally finds equilibria in bimatrix games by identifying completely labeled vertex pairs in the strategy polytopes.