Comparar métodos
Revisa los métodos seleccionados uno junto a otro; las filas que difieren aparecen resaltadas.
| Principal-Agent Analysis in the Public Sector× | Policy Implementation Analysis× | |
|---|---|---|
| Campo | Public Administration | Public Administration |
| Familia | Process / pipeline | Process / pipeline |
| Año de origen≠ | 1984 | 1973 |
| Autor original≠ | Terry M. Moe | Jeffrey Pressman & Aaron Wildavsky |
| Tipo≠ | Institutional-economics analysis | Process-tracing policy analysis |
| Fuente seminal≠ | Moe, T. M. (1984). The New Economics of Organization. American Journal of Political Science, 28(4), 739–777. DOI ↗ | Pressman, J. L., & Wildavsky, A. (1973). Implementation: How Great Expectations in Washington Are Dashed in Oakland. Berkeley: University of California Press. ISBN: 9780520053311 |
| Alias | Public Principal-Agent Analysis, Agency Theory in Government, Political Control Delegation Analysis | Implementation Studies, Top-Down Implementation Analysis, Implementation Gap Analysis |
| Relacionados | 4 | 4 |
| Resumen≠ | Principal-agent analysis in the public sector applies agency theory to the chains of delegation that run through government — from voters to legislators, legislators to executives, and executives to bureaucracies. Terry Moe's 1984 article The New Economics of Organization brought this institutional-economics lens into the study of public bureaucracy, asking how political principals can control agents who have their own interests and superior information. The method identifies the principal and agent, specifies how their goals diverge, characterises the information asymmetry between them, and examines the control mechanisms principals use to limit agency losses. Its purpose is to explain bureaucratic behaviour and the design of oversight as the predictable result of delegation under conflicting incentives. | Policy implementation analysis studies what happens between the moment a policy is decided and the moment it reaches its intended effect, asking why outcomes so often fall short of stated objectives. The field was founded by Jeffrey Pressman and Aaron Wildavsky's 1973 study of a federal employment program in Oakland, which showed how a long chain of required agreements and clearances steadily eroded great expectations. The method traces the implementation chain — the actors, decision points and conditions through which a policy must pass — to locate where and why it succeeds or fails. Its central object is the implementation gap between policy as legislated and policy as delivered. |
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