Comparar métodos
Revisa los métodos seleccionados uno junto a otro; las filas que difieren aparecen resaltadas.
| Operational Code Analysis× | Prospect Theory in International Relations× | |
|---|---|---|
| Campo | International Relations | International Relations |
| Familia | Process / pipeline | Process / pipeline |
| Año de origen≠ | 1969 | 1997 |
| Autor original≠ | Nathan Leites (origin); Alexander George (construct); Walker, Schafer & Young (VICS) | Kahneman & Tversky (theory); Jack Levy and others (IR application) |
| Tipo≠ | Content-analytic measurement of leaders' political belief systems | Behavioral decision-theoretic framework for foreign-policy choice |
| Fuente seminal≠ | George, A. L. (1969). The 'operational code': A neglected approach to the study of political leaders and decision-making. International Studies Quarterly, 13(2), 190–222. DOI ↗ | Levy, J. S. (1997). Prospect theory, rational choice, and international relations. International Studies Quarterly, 41(1), 87–112. DOI ↗ |
| Alias | Operational Code, Verbs in Context System (VICS), Belief System Analysis, Operational Code Construct | Prospect Theory IR, Loss Aversion in Foreign Policy, Framing and Risk in International Relations, Behavioral Decision Theory in IR |
| Relacionados | 3 | 3 |
| Resumen≠ | Operational code analysis measures a political leader's belief system — their fundamental assumptions about the nature of politics and the best strategies for pursuing goals — from the leader's own words. Originating in Nathan Leites's study of the Bolshevik mindset and reformulated by Alexander George (1969) into a structured set of philosophical and instrumental questions, it later became a quantitative method through the Verbs in Context System (VICS). By coding how a leader talks about conflict, cooperation, control, and risk, analysts characterize the cognitive framework through which that leader interprets the world and chooses action. | Prospect theory, the behavioral account of choice under risk developed by Kahneman and Tversky, has been applied across international relations to explain foreign-policy decisions that expected-utility models struggle with. As surveyed and assessed by Jack Levy (1997), the key ideas are that leaders evaluate outcomes as gains and losses relative to a reference point rather than in absolute terms, that losses loom larger than equivalent gains (loss aversion), and that people are risk-averse for gains but risk-seeking to avoid losses. These departures from rationality illuminate why states gamble to recover losses and take excessive risks to defend the status quo. |
| ScholarGateConjunto de datos ↗ |
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