Institutional and Historical Definitions of Art

Procedural definitions locate arthood not in an object's intrinsic features but in its relation to an institution—the artworld—or to the history of art.

Definition

Institutional and historical definitions hold that an object is art in virtue of a relation it bears to a social practice (the artworld) or to art's own past, rather than in virtue of any perceptible property it possesses.

Scope

This topic covers the procedural definitions that emerged after anti-essentialism: Danto's argument that the artworld of theory and history is what transfigures ordinary objects into art, Dickie's institutional theory of conferred status, and Levinson's historical definition that ties arthood to intended regard in the ways prior art was regarded. It treats their motivations, formulations, and the standard objections of circularity and conferral. It does not restate the open-concept argument, covered at the area level.

Core questions

• What makes an ordinary object, such as a snow shovel, into a work of art?
• Can the status of art be conferred by an institution?
• Is arthood essentially historical or backward-looking?
• Do procedural definitions avoid or merely relocate circularity?

Key theories

The institutional theory

Dickie holds that a work of art is an artifact upon which a person acting on behalf of the artworld has conferred the status of candidate for appreciation, making arthood a matter of social procedure.

Danto's artworld and the 'is' of artistic identification

Danto argues that what separates Warhol's Brillo Boxes from grocery cartons is an atmosphere of theory and history—the artworld—that lets us see the object as embodying meaning.

Historical definition

Levinson defines art relationally: an object is art at a time if it is intended for regard in any way prior artworks were correctly regarded, grounding the concept in an evolving tradition without a fixed essence.

History

Duchamp's readymades and Warhol's Brillo Boxes posed the problem of how perceptually indistinguishable objects can differ in art status. Danto's 1964 essay 'The Artworld' and his 1981 book argued that the difference lies in theory and history, inspiring Dickie's institutional theory of conferred status. Levinson's 1979 historical definition shifted the relation from a contemporaneous institution to art's own past, and subsequent work has combined intentional, historical, and functional elements into disjunctive definitions.

Debates

Circularity of conferral

Defining art by reference to the artworld appears circular, since the artworld is itself characterized in terms of art; defenders argue the circularity is informative rather than vicious.

The problem of first art

Historical definitions face the worry that the earliest artworks could not have been intended for regard in the ways prior art was regarded, since there was no prior art.

Key figures

• George Dickie
• Arthur Danto
• Jerrold Levinson
• Robert Stecker

Seminal works

• dickie1974
• danto1981
• levinson1979

Frequently asked questions

How can two identical objects differ in being art?

Procedural theories answer that art status is not fixed by perceptible properties: Danto appeals to the surrounding theory and history, and Dickie to a conferral by the artworld, so two perceptually identical objects can differ in their relation to those practices.

Is the institutional theory circular?

It defines art partly in terms of the artworld, which is itself defined in terms of art. Critics call this vicious circularity; Dickie replies that the interrelated concepts illuminate a genuine social practice rather than reducing it to non-art terms.