Essence and De Re Modality
Some properties seem to belong to a thing necessarily, by its very nature, while others are merely accidental. This topic studies essential properties and de re modal claims about how individuals must or could have been.
Definition
An essential property is one a thing could not lack while existing; de re modality concerns necessity and possibility attributed to an object independently of how it is described.
Scope
Covers the essential-accidental distinction, de re versus de dicto modality, Quine's skepticism about essentialism, Kripkean essentialism about origin and kind, and Fine's view that essence is prior to and not reducible to necessity.
Core questions
- Do things have essential as opposed to merely accidental properties?
- Is de re modality coherent, or relative to description?
- Can essence be reduced to necessity, or is it more basic?
- What are the essential properties of an ordinary object?
Key concepts
- Essence
- Essential property
- Accidental property
- De re and de dicto
- Necessity of origin
- Real definition
Key theories
- Kripkean essentialism
- Kripke argues that individuals have essential properties, such as their origin and fundamental kind, that hold of them in every world in which they exist, supporting de re necessity.
- Essence as prior to modality
- Fine contends that an object's essence concerns what it is to be that object and cannot be captured by the necessary truths about it, since some necessary properties are not part of a thing's essence.
- Quinean skepticism about de re modality
- Quine objects that essentialism makes necessity depend illegitimately on how an object is described, casting doubt on the intelligibility of de re modal claims.
History
Aristotle distinguished essence from accident and tied essence to real definition. Quine challenged the coherence of de re essentialism in the mid-twentieth century. Kripke rehabilitated essentialism via rigid designation, and Fine revived a fine-grained, definition-based notion of essence distinct from modal necessity.
Debates
- Is essence reducible to necessity?
- The modal account analyzes an essential property as one a thing has necessarily; Fine argues this fails because some necessary properties are extrinsic to a thing's nature, so essence must be taken as more basic.
Key figures
- Aristotle
- W. V. O. Quine
- Saul Kripke
- Kit Fine
- David Wiggins
Related topics
Seminal works
- kripke1980
- fine1994
Frequently asked questions
- What is the difference between de re and de dicto modality?
- De dicto modality attaches necessity to a whole proposition ('necessarily, all bachelors are unmarried'), while de re modality attributes a modal property to an object itself ('this person is necessarily human'), independently of how it is described.