What is the principle of credulity?

It is Swinburne's epistemic principle that, in the absence of special reasons for doubt, one is rationally entitled to believe that things are as they appear, which he extends to apparent experiences of God.

Does the variety of religious experiences refute the argument?

Critics think the conflicting descriptions across traditions weaken any single tradition's claim, but defenders respond that diverse experiences may still jointly support the existence of some transcendent reality even if they describe it differently.

Arguments from Religious Experience

The claim that direct experiences as of God provide evidence for God's existence in a way analogous to how sense perception provides evidence for physical objects.

Definition

An argument that takes apparent perceptions of, or encounters with, a divine reality to confer prima facie justification on belief in that reality's existence.

Scope

This topic covers the epistemology of religious and mystical experience, including Swinburne's principle of credulity, Alston's account of theistic perception as a doxastic practice, and James's psychological study of varieties of religious experience. It covers objections from the diversity of religious experiences across traditions and from naturalistic explanations. It does not cover the broader problem of religious pluralism, treated as a separate area.

Core questions

Should apparent experiences of God be trusted in the same way as ordinary perceptual experiences?
Does the conflicting content of religious experiences across traditions undermine their evidential value?
Can naturalistic explanations of religious experience defeat its evidential force?
Is theistic perception a rational doxastic practice on a par with sense perception?

Key theories

Principle of credulity: Swinburne argues that, absent special reasons for doubt, it is rational to believe that things are as they seem to be; applied to religious experience, apparent perceptions of God therefore provide genuine, if defeasible, evidence for God's existence.
Theistic perception as doxastic practice: Alston argues that forming beliefs about God on the basis of mystical perceptual experience is a socially established doxastic practice as rationally reputable as sense perception, since neither can be validated without circularity.

History

William James's 1902 Gifford Lectures established the modern study of religious experience as a psychological phenomenon. Rudolf Otto's analysis of the numinous followed. In analytic philosophy of religion, Swinburne in the 1970s and Alston in 1991 developed sustained arguments that such experience can justify theistic belief, prompting extensive debate about perceptual analogies.

Debates

Whether conflicting religious experiences cancel out: Critics argue that incompatible experiences across traditions, each claiming veridicality, undercut their evidential value; defenders reply that the experiences agree on the existence of a transcendent reality even where their descriptions diverge.
Whether the perceptual analogy holds: Defenders treat experience of God as analogous to sense perception, but critics such as Mackie argue the analogy fails because there are no agreed checking procedures for religious perception comparable to those for ordinary perception.

Key figures

William James
Rudolf Otto
William Alston
Richard Swinburne
Caroline Franks Davis

Seminal works

alston1991
swinburne2004
james1902

Frequently asked questions

What is the principle of credulity?: It is Swinburne's epistemic principle that, in the absence of special reasons for doubt, one is rationally entitled to believe that things are as they appear, which he extends to apparent experiences of God.
Does the variety of religious experiences refute the argument?: Critics think the conflicting descriptions across traditions weaken any single tradition's claim, but defenders respond that diverse experiences may still jointly support the existence of some transcendent reality even if they describe it differently.