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| Foreign Policy Similarity Score× | Alliance Portfolio Similarity× | |
|---|---|---|
| Field | International Relations | International Relations |
| Family | Process / pipeline | Process / pipeline |
| Year of origin≠ | 2011 | 1999 |
| Originator≠ | Foreign-policy-similarity literature (Signorino & Ritter; Voeten ideal points; Frank Häge chance correction) | Bueno de Mesquita (Tau-b); Curtis Signorino & Jeffrey Ritter (S) |
| Type≠ | Dyadic measurement of revealed foreign-policy agreement | Dyadic similarity index over alliance commitment profiles |
| Seminal source≠ | Häge, F. M. (2011). Choice or circumstance? Adjusting measures of foreign policy similarity for chance agreement. Political Analysis, 19(3), 287–305. DOI ↗ | Signorino, C. S., & Ritter, J. M. (1999). Tau-b or not Tau-b: Measuring the similarity of foreign policy positions. International Studies Quarterly, 43(1), 115–144. DOI ↗ |
| Aliases | Foreign Policy Similarity Measurement, UN Voting Affinity Score, Ideal Point Distance, State Preference Similarity | Alliance Portfolio Similarity Scores, S-Score of Alliance Similarity, Tau-b Alliance Similarity, Alliance Profile Similarity |
| Related | 3 | 3 |
| Summary≠ | A foreign-policy similarity score measures how alike two states' revealed foreign-policy positions are — most commonly from their votes in the UN General Assembly, but also from alliance portfolios or treaty positions. It is a workhorse measure of shared interests, affinity, and alignment in dyadic IR. Häge (2011) shows that naive agreement and the popular S-score can be inflated by chance agreement that arises because states differ in how often they take each position, and proposes chance-corrected indices (Scott's π, Cohen's κ) that better isolate genuine alignment. | Alliance portfolio similarity measures how alike two states' overall patterns of alliance commitments are. Each state has a 'portfolio' — the profile of defense pacts, neutrality agreements, ententes, or no tie it holds with every other state — and the similarity of two portfolios is summarized in a single dyadic score. Signorino and Ritter (1999) showed that the long-dominant Kendall's tau-b measure is flawed for this purpose and introduced the S-score as a better-behaved alternative. These scores are a standard proxy for shared interests and have been used to operationalize utilities in expected-utility models of war. |
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