Compare methods
Review your selected methods side by side; rows that differ are highlighted.
| Comparative Political Economy× | Power Resources Analysis× | |
|---|---|---|
| Field | Political Economy | Political Economy |
| Family | Process / pipeline | Process / pipeline |
| Year of origin≠ | 2001 | 1983 |
| Originator≠ | Comparative politics & political economy tradition (Shonfield, Katzenstein, Hall, Soskice) | Walter Korpi & Gosta Esping-Andersen |
| Type≠ | Macro-comparative research framework | Comparative political economy theory |
| Seminal source≠ | Hall, P. A., & Soskice, D. (Eds.). (2001). Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage. Oxford University Press. ISBN: 9780199247752 | Korpi, W. (1983). The Democratic Class Struggle. Routledge & Kegan Paul. ISBN: 9780710094490 |
| Aliases | CPE, Comparative Capitalisms Approach, Macro-Comparative Political Economy, Institutional Political Economy | Power Resources Theory, Power Resource Approach, Class Mobilization Theory, Korpi Power Resources Model |
| Related≠ | 3 | 4 |
| Summary≠ | Comparative political economy (CPE) is the subfield that asks how political institutions and markets interact to produce different economic outcomes across capitalist democracies, and the macro-comparative research strategy that subfield employs. Rather than treating the economy as a self-contained system, CPE treats production regimes, labor markets, finance, welfare states, and innovation as politically constructed and institutionally embedded, then compares how distinct national configurations — for instance the liberal market economies and coordinated market economies of Hall and Soskice's varieties-of-capitalism framework — generate systematically different patterns of wages, growth, inequality, and adjustment. The approach combines small-N case comparison and large-N cross-national analysis under a shared institutionalist logic. | Power resources analysis is a comparative political-economy framework, developed above all by Walter Korpi in The Democratic Class Struggle (1983) and extended by Gosta Esping-Andersen in The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (1990), that explains the size and shape of welfare states by the distribution of power resources between social classes. Its central claim is that under democratic capitalism the working class can offset capital's structural advantage in markets by mobilizing political power resources — above all the organizational strength of trade unions and the governing strength of left and labor parties. Where labor is strongly organized and durably in government, it builds class coalitions that translate that power into generous, redistributive social policy and a high degree of decommodification: the extent to which citizens can maintain a livelihood without depending on the market. |
| ScholarGateDataset ↗ |
|
|