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| Two-Level Game Analysis× | Voting Power Index Analysis× | |
|---|---|---|
| Fagområde | Political Science | Political Science |
| Familie | MCDM | MCDM |
| Oprindelsesår≠ | 1988 | 1954 |
| Ophavsperson≠ | Robert D. Putnam | Lloyd Shapley & Martin Shubik; John F. Banzhaf III |
| Type≠ | Framework for analyzing international negotiation under domestic constraints | Cooperative game-theoretic measure of a priori voting power |
| Oprindelig kilde≠ | Putnam, R. D. (1988). Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games. International Organization, 42(3), 427-460. DOI ↗ | Shapley, L. S., & Shubik, M. (1954). A Method for Evaluating the Distribution of Power in a Committee System. American Political Science Review, 48(3), 787-792. DOI ↗ |
| Aliasser | Two-Level Games, Putnam Two-Level Game Framework, Win-Set Analysis, Double-Edged Diplomacy | Voting Power Index, Shapley-Shubik Index, Banzhaf Power Index, A Priori Voting Power Analysis |
| Relaterede | 4 | 4 |
| Resumé≠ | Two-level game analysis is a framework introduced by Robert Putnam in 1988 for understanding how international negotiations are jointly shaped by bargaining between governments and the need to win domestic approval. A negotiator plays simultaneously at two tables: Level I, where states bargain over an agreement, and Level II, where that agreement must be ratified by domestic constituents. The key analytic device is the win-set — the set of Level I deals that could secure domestic ratification — and an agreement is possible only where the negotiating states' win-sets overlap. | Voting power index analysis measures the a priori capacity of each member of a weighted voting body to influence collective decisions, defined as the probability that the member is pivotal — that their vote turns a losing coalition into a winning one. The two canonical indices are the Shapley-Shubik index, introduced by Lloyd Shapley and Martin Shubik in 1954 as a specialization of the Shapley value to simple voting games, and the Banzhaf index, formalized by John Banzhaf in 1965. Both reveal that a player's share of power generally differs sharply from its share of votes. |
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