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| Principal-Agent Model× | VCG-mekanismen× | |
|---|---|---|
| Fagområde | Spilteori | Spilteori |
| Familie | Machine learning | Machine learning |
| Oprindelsesår≠ | 1976 | 1961 |
| Ophavsperson≠ | Michael Jensen, William Meckling, Bengt Holmstrom | William Vickrey, Edward Clarke, Theodore Groves |
| Type | algorithm | algorithm |
| Oprindelig kilde≠ | Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3(4), 305-360. DOI ↗ | Vickrey, W. (1961). Counterspeculation, auctions, and competitive sealed bids. The Journal of Finance, 16(1), 8-37. DOI ↗ |
| Aliasser | Agency Theory, Hidden Action Problem, Moral Hazard | Vickrey Mechanism, Generalized Vickrey Auction, Truthful Mechanism |
| Relaterede | 4 | 4 |
| Resumé≠ | The Principal-Agent Model analyzes how a principal (e.g., owner, employer, policymaker) can incentivize an agent (e.g., manager, employee, firm) to act in the principal's interest when the agent has private information or can take hidden actions. Formalized by Jensen and Meckling in 1976, the model identifies agency costs arising from moral hazard (the agent exerts less effort than desired) and adverse selection (the agent hides unfavorable information). Optimal contracts balance incentives with risk allocation. | The Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) Mechanism is a truthful mechanism design solution that allocates resources and determines payments to incentivize participants to reveal their true valuations. Building on William Vickrey's 1961 sealed-bid auction work and extended by Clarke and Groves, VCG ensures that reporting truth is a dominant strategy for all participants, achieving allocative efficiency while maximizing total surplus. |
| ScholarGateDatasæt ↗ |
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