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| Arrow-Debreu Ligevægt× | VCG-mekanismen× | |
|---|---|---|
| Fagområde | Spilteori | Spilteori |
| Familie | Machine learning | Machine learning |
| Oprindelsesår≠ | 1954 | 1961 |
| Ophavsperson≠ | Kenneth Arrow, Gerard Debreu | William Vickrey, Edward Clarke, Theodore Groves |
| Type | algorithm | algorithm |
| Oprindelig kilde≠ | Arrow, K. J., & Debreu, G. (1954). Existence of an equilibrium for competitive economies. Econometrica, 22(3), 265-290. DOI ↗ | Vickrey, W. (1961). Counterspeculation, auctions, and competitive sealed bids. The Journal of Finance, 16(1), 8-37. DOI ↗ |
| Aliasser | Walrasian Equilibrium, General Equilibrium, Competitive Equilibrium | Vickrey Mechanism, Generalized Vickrey Auction, Truthful Mechanism |
| Relaterede | 4 | 4 |
| Resumé≠ | The Arrow-Debreu model is a general equilibrium framework where prices adjust to clear all markets simultaneously, and consumers and firms optimize given those prices. Introduced by Kenneth Arrow and Gerard Debreu in 1954, the model extends Adam Smith's invisible hand concept into a rigorous mathematical framework. Arrow-Debreu equilibrium proves existence, uniqueness (under certain conditions), and Pareto efficiency of competitive equilibria. | The Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) Mechanism is a truthful mechanism design solution that allocates resources and determines payments to incentivize participants to reveal their true valuations. Building on William Vickrey's 1961 sealed-bid auction work and extended by Clarke and Groves, VCG ensures that reporting truth is a dominant strategy for all participants, achieving allocative efficiency while maximizing total surplus. |
| ScholarGateDatasæt ↗ |
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