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| AES (Rijndael)× | Side-Channel Analysis× | |
|---|---|---|
| Fagområde | Kryptografi | Kryptografi |
| Familie | Machine learning | Machine learning |
| Oprindelsesår≠ | 2001 | 1996 |
| Ophavsperson≠ | Joan Daemen | Paul Kocher |
| Type≠ | symmetric encryption algorithm | physical side-channel exploitation |
| Oprindelig kilde≠ | Daemen, J., & Rijmen, V. (2002). The Design of Rijndael: AES - The Advanced Encryption Standard. Springer-Verlag. ISBN: 978-3540425809 | Kocher, P. C. (1996). Timing attacks on implementations of Diffie-Hellman, RSA, DSS, and other systems. In Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO 1996, LNCS 1109, pp. 104-113. DOI ↗ |
| Aliasser≠ | Rijndael, AES encryption, FIPS 197 | SCA, timing attack, power analysis, cache attack |
| Relaterede≠ | 4 | 3 |
| Resumé≠ | The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), also known as Rijndael, is a symmetric block cipher adopted as the official encryption standard by the U.S. government in 2001. It processes data in 128-bit blocks using 128, 192, or 256-bit keys and performs multiple rounds of substitution, permutation, and mixing operations. AES is the most widely used symmetric encryption algorithm today, securing everything from government communications to everyday internet traffic. | Side-channel analysis is a family of attacks that exploit physical properties of cryptographic implementations (timing, power consumption, electromagnetic emissions, cache behavior) to recover secret keys. Introduced by Paul Kocher in 1996, side-channel attacks have repeatedly broken implementations of theoretically secure cryptosystems by leveraging unintended information leakage. Side-channel analysis has become a critical concern in cryptographic system design, requiring constant-time implementations and physical countermeasures. |
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