Pessimistic Meta-Induction
The pessimistic meta-induction argues that because many past successful theories turned out false, our current successful theories are probably false too.
Definition
The pessimistic meta-induction is an inductive argument from the history of science: since the historical record contains many theories that were empirically successful yet are now regarded as false with non-referring central terms, we should infer that present successful theories are likewise probably false.
Scope
This topic covers Laudan's historical challenge to convergent realism, the role of his list of successful-but-discarded theories (such as the ether and caloric), and the realist responses of selective and structural realism that try to identify the success-bearing parts of theories that survive change.
Core questions
- Does the history of science show that success is no guide to truth?
- Were the central terms of discarded theories genuinely non-referring?
- Can realists identify which parts of a theory carry its success?
- Does structural realism escape the argument?
Key concepts
- convergent realism
- reference of theoretical terms
- success-to-truth inference
- deployment realism
- continuity across theory change
Key theories
- Confutation of convergent realism
- Laudan compiles successful past theories with false or non-referring posits to break the realist link between empirical success, truth, and reference.
- Selective (deployment) realism
- Psillos replies that only the theoretical constituents essentially deployed in successful predictions need be true, and these tend to be retained across theory change.
- Structural realism
- Worrall argues that what survives theory change is mathematical structure rather than the nature of entities, so realism should be confined to structure.
History
Laudan's 1981 'Confutation of Convergent Realism' marshalled historical cases against the realist inference from success to truth. It reshaped the realism debate, prompting selective realism (Psillos) and the structural realism revived by Worrall in 1989 as ways of conceding theory change while preserving a realist core.
Debates
- Which parts of theories survive?
- Realists argue that the success-conferring components of past theories were retained or refer, blunting the induction, while Laudan denies any principled, non-circular way to isolate those components in advance.
Key figures
- Larry Laudan
- Stathis Psillos
- John Worrall
Related topics
Seminal works
- laudan1981
- worrall1989
Frequently asked questions
- What are standard examples used in the argument?
- Laudan cites theories like the caloric theory of heat, the phlogiston theory of combustion, and the luminiferous ether of optics: each was empirically successful in its day yet posited entities now thought not to exist, suggesting present success is likewise no guarantee of truth.