ScholarGate
Asistent
MCDMBargaining / game theory

Two-Level Game Analysis

Two-level game analysis is a framework introduced by Robert Putnam in 1988 for understanding how international negotiations are jointly shaped by bargaining between governments and the need to win domestic approval. A negotiator plays simultaneously at two tables: Level I, where states bargain over an agreement, and Level II, where that agreement must be ratified by domestic constituents. The key analytic device is the win-set — the set of Level I deals that could secure domestic ratification — and an agreement is possible only where the negotiating states' win-sets overlap.

Otevřít v MethodMindJiž brzyPoužijte, porovnejte, získejte návod
Nástroje a zdroje
Stáhnout prezentaci
Učte se a objevujte
VideoJiž brzy

Přečíst celou metodu

Pouze pro členy

Pro přečtení této sekce se přihlaste s bezplatným účtem.

Přihlásit se

Mapa metod

Okolí příbuzných metod — vyberte uzel, který chcete prozkoumat.

Zdroje

  1. Putnam, R. D. (1988). Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games. International Organization, 42(3), 427-460. DOI: 10.1017/S0020818300027697
  2. Evans, P. B., Jacobson, H. K., & Putnam, R. D. (Eds.). (1993). Double-Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics. University of California Press. ISBN: 9780520076822

Jak citovat tuto stránku

ScholarGate. (2026, June 22). Two-Level Game Theory (Putnam's International-Domestic Bargaining). ScholarGate. https://scholargate.app/cs/political-science/two-level-game-analysis

Která metoda?

Postavte tuto metodu vedle jejích nejbližších příbuzných a čtěte je vedle sebe — knihovna položí knihy na stůl; volba je na vás.

Porovnat vedle sebe

Odkazuje sem

ScholarGateTwo-Level Game Analysis (Two-Level Game Theory (Putnam's International-Domestic Bargaining)). Získáno 2026-06-24 z https://scholargate.app/cs/political-science/two-level-game-analysis · Datová sada: https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.20539026