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Subherní dokonalá rovnováha×Evoluční teorie her×
OborTeorie herTeorie her
RodinaMachine learningMachine learning
Rok vzniku19651973
TvůrceReinhard SeltenJohn Maynard Smith, George Price
Typalgorithmalgorithm
Původní zdrojSelten, R. (1965). Spieltheoretische Behandlung eines Oligopolmodells mit Nachfrageträgheit. Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft, 121, 301-324. link ↗Smith, J. M., & Price, G. R. (1973). The logic of animal conflict. Nature, 246(5427), 15-18. DOI ↗
Další názvyBackward Induction, Sequential Equilibrium, Extensive-Form EquilibriumESS, Evolutionarily Stable Strategy, Replicator Dynamics
Příbuzné44
ShrnutíSubgame Perfect Equilibrium (SPE) is a refinement of Nash Equilibrium for sequential games, introduced by Reinhard Selten in 1965. It requires that strategy profiles constitute a Nash Equilibrium in every subgame, eliminating non-credible threats and incredible promises. Backward induction is the primary computational method for finding SPE in finite games.Evolutionary Game Theory applies game-theoretic reasoning to biological evolution and social dynamics, where populations of agents with different strategies interact repeatedly. Introduced by John Maynard Smith and George Price in 1973, the framework uses the concept of Evolutionarily Stable Strategies (ESS) to identify strategy distributions that cannot be invaded by mutant strategies. Replicator dynamics describe how strategy frequencies evolve over time when reproduction is proportional to payoff success.
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ScholarGatePorovnat metody: Subgame Perfect Equilibrium · Evolutionary Game Theory. Získáno 2026-06-18 z https://scholargate.app/cs/compare