Porovnat metody
Prohlédněte si vybrané metody vedle sebe; řádky, které se liší, jsou zvýrazněny.
| Hodnota Shapley× | Mechanismus VCG× | |
|---|---|---|
| Obor | Teorie her | Teorie her |
| Rodina | Machine learning | Machine learning |
| Rok vzniku≠ | 1953 | 1961 |
| Tvůrce≠ | Lloyd Shapley | William Vickrey, Edward Clarke, Theodore Groves |
| Typ | algorithm | algorithm |
| Původní zdroj≠ | Shapley, L. S. (1953). A value for n-person games. In H. W. Kuhn & A. W. Tucker (Eds.), Contributions to the Theory of Games II (pp. 307-317). Princeton University Press. DOI ↗ | Vickrey, W. (1961). Counterspeculation, auctions, and competitive sealed bids. The Journal of Finance, 16(1), 8-37. DOI ↗ |
| Další názvy | Fair Division, Cooperative Game Solution, Dividend Vector | Vickrey Mechanism, Generalized Vickrey Auction, Truthful Mechanism |
| Příbuzné | 4 | 4 |
| Shrnutí≠ | The Shapley Value is a solution concept for coalition games that distributes total payoff fairly among players based on their marginal contributions to coalitions. Introduced by Lloyd Shapley in 1953, the Shapley Value is the unique payoff distribution that satisfies four intuitive axioms: efficiency (total payoff is distributed), symmetry (identical players receive equal payoff), null player (players contributing nothing receive nothing), and additivity across games. | The Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) Mechanism is a truthful mechanism design solution that allocates resources and determines payments to incentivize participants to reveal their true valuations. Building on William Vickrey's 1961 sealed-bid auction work and extended by Clarke and Groves, VCG ensures that reporting truth is a dominant strategy for all participants, achieving allocative efficiency while maximizing total surplus. |
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