পদ্ধতির তুলনা করুন
নির্বাচিত পদ্ধতিগুলো পাশাপাশি পর্যালোচনা করুন; যে সারিগুলোয় পার্থক্য আছে সেগুলো চিহ্নিত করা হয়।
| Top Trading Cycles× | ভিক্রে-ক্লার্ক-গ্রোভস (VCG) মেকানিজম× | |
|---|---|---|
| ক্ষেত্র | খেলা তত্ত্ব | খেলা তত্ত্ব |
| পরিবার | Machine learning | Machine learning |
| উদ্ভবের বছর≠ | 1974 | 1961 |
| প্রবর্তক≠ | Lloyd Shapley, Herbert Scarf | William Vickrey, Edward Clarke, Theodore Groves |
| ধরন | algorithm | algorithm |
| মৌলিক উৎস≠ | Shapley, L. S., & Scarf, H. (1974). On cores and indivisibility. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 1(1), 23-37. DOI ↗ | Vickrey, W. (1961). Counterspeculation, auctions, and competitive sealed bids. The Journal of Finance, 16(1), 8-37. DOI ↗ |
| অপর নাম | TTC, Shapley-Scarf Algorithm, Efficient Exchange | Vickrey Mechanism, Generalized Vickrey Auction, Truthful Mechanism |
| সম্পর্কিত | 4 | 4 |
| সারসংক্ষেপ≠ | Top Trading Cycles (TTC) is an algorithm for allocating indivisible goods to agents such that the allocation is Pareto efficient and individually rational. Developed by Lloyd Shapley and Herbert Scarf in 1974, the algorithm identifies cycles of trades in a preference digraph, executes those trades, and iteratively repeats until no further trades are beneficial. TTC is widely used in kidney exchange and housing allocation due to its efficiency and implementation simplicity. | The Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) Mechanism is a truthful mechanism design solution that allocates resources and determines payments to incentivize participants to reveal their true valuations. Building on William Vickrey's 1961 sealed-bid auction work and extended by Clarke and Groves, VCG ensures that reporting truth is a dominant strategy for all participants, achieving allocative efficiency while maximizing total surplus. |
| ScholarGateডেটাসেট ↗ |
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