পদ্ধতির তুলনা করুন
নির্বাচিত পদ্ধতিগুলো পাশাপাশি পর্যালোচনা করুন; যে সারিগুলোয় পার্থক্য আছে সেগুলো চিহ্নিত করা হয়।
| Democratic Norms Support Measurement× | Elite Cue Experiment× | |
|---|---|---|
| ক্ষেত্র | রাজনৈতিক মনোবিজ্ঞান | রাজনৈতিক মনোবিজ্ঞান |
| পরিবার | Process / pipeline | Process / pipeline |
| উদ্ভবের বছর≠ | 2020 | 1992 |
| প্রবর্তক≠ | Matthew Graham & Milan Svolik; Christopher Claassen | John Zaller; Stephen Nicholson |
| ধরন≠ | Experimental and survey measurement of democratic commitment | Survey experiment on source cues |
| মৌলিক উৎস≠ | Graham, M. H., & Svolik, M. W. (2020). Democracy in America? Partisanship, Polarization, and the Robustness of Support for Democracy in the United States. American Political Science Review, 114(2), 392-409. DOI ↗ | Zaller, J. R. (1992). The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion. Cambridge University Press. ISBN: 9780521407861 |
| অপর নাম | Support for Democracy Tradeoff Experiment, Democratic Backsliding Tolerance Measure, Graham-Svolik Democratic Norms Design, Commitment to Democratic Principles Measure | Party Cue Experiment, Source Cue Persuasion Experiment, Partisan Endorsement Cue Design, Elite Endorsement Experiment |
| সম্পর্কিত | 3 | 3 |
| সারসংক্ষেপ≠ | This approach measures how committed ordinary citizens are to democratic norms by observing the price they are willing to pay to uphold them. Rather than asking abstractly whether people value democracy, Matthew Graham and Milan Svolik's 2020 candidate-choice design confronts voters with a co-partisan candidate who violates a democratic principle and estimates how much electoral support that violation costs. Their finding that most Americans will tolerate undemocratic behavior by their own side when partisanship and policy stakes are high reframed the study of democratic backsliding around revealed, not professed, commitment. Christopher Claassen's parallel work links aggregate diffuse support for democracy to whether democracies survive. | An elite cue experiment isolates the persuasive power of source endorsements by holding a policy message constant and randomly varying who is said to support it. Grounded in John Zaller's receive-accept-sample model of mass opinion, which holds that citizens take cues from trusted political elites rather than reasoning from first principles, the design reveals how much opinion moves simply because a party or leader takes a side. Stephen Nicholson's work on polarizing cues shows that in-party endorsements can persuade while out-party endorsements provoke backlash, making the cue, not the argument, the engine of opinion change. |
| ScholarGateডেটাসেট ↗ |
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