Theories of Intentionality
Theories of intentionality try to explain, ideally in naturalistic terms, how mental states come to be about anything.
Definition
A theory of intentionality is an account of the conditions under which a mental state has the content it has, that is, of what relation a state must bear to the world for it to represent one thing rather than another.
Scope
This topic covers the main accounts of mental content: informational and causal-covariation theories, teleosemantics, asymmetric-dependence theory, and the challenges of misrepresentation and the disjunction problem that any such theory must solve.
Core questions
- What relation makes a mental state represent its object?
- How can a naturalistic theory allow for misrepresentation?
- Does content derive from information, biological function, or asymmetric dependence?
- Can intentionality be reduced to non-intentional facts at all?
Key concepts
- informational semantics
- teleosemantics
- asymmetric dependence
- misrepresentation
- disjunction problem
- indicator function
Key theories
- Informational semantics
- A state's content is fixed by the information it reliably carries about the world under suitable conditions.
- Teleosemantics
- Content is fixed by the biological function a representational system was selected to perform, allowing misrepresentation when the system malfunctions.
- Asymmetric-dependence theory
- A symbol means X when X-caused tokenings are what non-X-caused tokenings asymmetrically depend on, solving the disjunction problem for causal theories.
History
Building on Brentano's characterization of intentionality, the 1980s saw a wave of naturalizing projects: Dretske's informational semantics, Millikan's teleosemantics grounded in selection history, and Fodor's asymmetric-dependence account, each addressing the problem of how representation can misfire.
Debates
- The misrepresentation problem
- How a naturalistic theory can allow a state to represent something falsely without collapsing the content into a disjunction of its causes.
- Function versus information
- Whether biological function or carried information is the more fundamental determinant of content.
Key figures
- Fred Dretske
- Ruth Millikan
- Jerry Fodor
- Franz Brentano
Related topics
Seminal works
- brentano1874
- dretske1981
- millikan1984
- fodor1987
Frequently asked questions
- What is the disjunction problem?
- It is the difficulty that a simple causal theory of content makes a symbol mean the disjunction of everything that causes it, leaving no room for misrepresentation.