قارن الطرق
راجع الطرق التي اخترتها جنبًا إلى جنب؛ الصفوف المختلفة مميَّزة.
| تحليل شجرة الأخطاء القائم على المخاطر× | تحليل شجرة الأحداث (ETA)× | |
|---|---|---|
| المجال≠ | التصميم التجريبي | الموثوقية |
| العائلة | Process / pipeline | Process / pipeline |
| سنة النشأة≠ | 1961 (FTA origin); risk-based integration formalised 1975–1981 | 2002 |
| صاحب الطريقة≠ | H.A. Watson (Bell Labs) and developed further by Boeing/U.S. Air Force; risk-based extension via NRC probabilistic risk assessment programs | Andrews & Moss |
| النوع≠ | Quantitative safety and reliability analysis | Forward inductive logic tree |
| المصدر التأسيسي≠ | Vesely, W. E., Goldberg, F. F., Roberts, N. H., & Haasl, D. F. (1981). Fault Tree Handbook. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NUREG-0492. link ↗ | Andrews, J. D., & Moss, T. R. (2002). Reliability and Risk Assessment (2nd ed.). Professional Engineering Publishing. ISBN: 978-1-86058-290-5 |
| الأسماء البديلة | RB-FTA, risk-informed FTA, quantitative fault tree analysis, probabilistic fault tree analysis | ETA, Event Sequence Diagram Analysis, Initiating Event Analysis, Olay Ağacı Analizi |
| ذات صلة≠ | 6 | 2 |
| الملخص≠ | Risk-based fault tree analysis (RB-FTA) combines classical fault tree analysis with explicit quantitative risk assessment. Starting from an undesired top event, the analyst decomposes it into contributing causes using AND/OR logic gates, assigns failure probabilities to basic events from reliability databases or historical data, and then propagates those probabilities through the tree to compute top-event likelihood. The result is expressed as risk — probability weighted by consequence severity — enabling prioritisation of safety interventions by their actual risk reduction impact. | Event Tree Analysis (ETA) is a forward inductive technique used in reliability and risk engineering to model the possible outcomes that follow an initiating event. Starting from a single undesired event, ETA traces all subsequent event sequences through a binary branching tree representing the success or failure of safety barriers and protective systems. Introduced formally in reliability and risk literature by Andrews and Moss (2002), it is widely applied in nuclear, chemical, and aerospace industries to quantify accident sequence probabilities and guide safety decision-making. |
| ScholarGateمجموعة البيانات ↗ |
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