قارن الطرق
راجع الطرق التي اخترتها جنبًا إلى جنب؛ الصفوف المختلفة مميَّزة.
| Bow-Tie Risk Analysis× | تحليل شجرة الأعطال (FTA)× | |
|---|---|---|
| المجال≠ | Disaster Studies | الموثوقية |
| العائلة | Process / pipeline | Process / pipeline |
| سنة النشأة≠ | 2016 | 1981 |
| صاحب الطريقة≠ | Synthesized review by de Ruijter & Guldenmund; standardized in ISO/IEC 31010 | Vesely et al. (US NRC Fault Tree Handbook) |
| النوع≠ | Barrier-centred cause-consequence risk diagram and analysis | Deductive top-down failure analysis |
| المصدر التأسيسي≠ | de Ruijter, A., & Guldenmund, F. (2016). The bowtie method: A review. Safety Science, 88, 211-218. DOI ↗ | Vesely, W. E., Goldberg, F. F., Roberts, N. H., & Haasl, D. F. (1981). Fault Tree Handbook (NUREG-0492). U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. link ↗ |
| الأسماء البديلة | Bowtie Method, Bow-Tie Diagram, Barrier Analysis (Bow-Tie), Cause-Consequence Barrier Model | FTA, Fault Tree Method, Top-Down Reliability Analysis, Hata Ağacı Analizi |
| ذات صلة | 3 | 3 |
| الملخص≠ | Bow-tie risk analysis is a barrier-centred technique that places a single top event — the moment control over a hazard is lost — at the knot of a diagram, branches its possible causes to the left and its possible consequences to the right, and arrays along each pathway the barriers meant to prevent or mitigate it. The shape gives the method its name: the fanning threats and consequences form the two halves of a bow tie around the central event. de Ruijter and Guldenmund's 2016 review in Safety Science documents how the approach grew popular precisely because it combines, in one readable picture, the cause logic of a fault tree and the consequence logic of an event tree while foregrounding the controls that managers actually own. ISO/IEC 31010 lists bow-tie analysis among standard risk-assessment techniques, used both qualitatively to communicate risk and barrier coverage and quantitatively to estimate consequence likelihoods. | Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) is a top-down, deductive reliability method that begins with an undesired top-level failure event and systematically traces backward through chains of contributing causes using Boolean logic gates (AND, OR). First formalized by Watson at Bell Telephone Laboratories in 1961 and later standardized by Vesely, Goldberg, Roberts, and Haasl in the landmark 1981 NRC Fault Tree Handbook, FTA has become a cornerstone of quantitative risk assessment in nuclear, aerospace, and industrial safety engineering. |
| ScholarGateمجموعة البيانات ↗ |
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