Veto Player Analysis
Veto player analysis is a spatial-institutional framework, developed by George Tsebelis in his 1995 article and 2002 book, for predicting the capacity of a political system to change policy. A veto player is any individual or collective actor whose agreement is required to alter the status quo. The theory shows that the potential for policy change shrinks as the number of veto players grows, as the ideological distance between them widens, and as their internal cohesion increases — three structural variables that together determine a system's policy stability independently of constitutional labels such as presidentialism or parliamentarism.
Изворни запис
Цитирани радови су копирани дословно из изворног записа методе. Из њих се не изводи верификација на нивоу тврдње.
- Tsebelis, G. (2002). Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work. Princeton University Press. · ISBN 9780691091891
- Tsebelis, G. (1995). Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism and Multipartyism. British Journal of Political Science, 25(3), 289-325. · DOI 10.1017/S0007123400007225
Куроване тврдње
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Овај приказ не измишља процену тврдње када регистар нема ниједну.
Сродне методе
Генерисано из графа метода и приказано као машински предложене везе — не изводи се тврдња доказа.