Two-Level Game Analysis
Two-level game analysis is a framework introduced by Robert Putnam in 1988 for understanding how international negotiations are jointly shaped by bargaining between governments and the need to win domestic approval. A negotiator plays simultaneously at two tables: Level I, where states bargain over an agreement, and Level II, where that agreement must be ratified by domestic constituents. The key analytic device is the win-set — the set of Level I deals that could secure domestic ratification — and an agreement is possible only where the negotiating states' win-sets overlap.
Изворни запис
Цитирани радови су копирани дословно из изворног записа методе. Из њих се не изводи верификација на нивоу тврдње.
- Putnam, R. D. (1988). Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games. International Organization, 42(3), 427-460. · DOI 10.1017/S0020818300027697
- Evans, P. B., Jacobson, H. K., & Putnam, R. D. (Eds.). (1993). Double-Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics. University of California Press. · ISBN 9780520076822
Куроване тврдње
Тврдње су сачуване у регистру доказа, свака са својом проценом.
Овај приказ не измишља процену тврдње када регистар нема ниједну.
Сродне методе
Генерисано из графа метода и приказано као машински предложене везе — не изводи се тврдња доказа.