Redistribution Preference Analysis
Also known as: Demand for Redistribution Analysis, Redistribution Attitudes Regression, Preferences for Redistribution Model, Support for Redistribution Analysis
Redistribution preference analysis examines why individuals support or oppose government efforts to reduce inequality. The self-interest baseline comes from Meltzer and Richard's 1981 model, in which the demand for redistribution falls with one's own income because the rich pay more and receive less from transfers. Benabou and Ok's 2001 POUM (prospect of upward mobility) hypothesis adds a forward-looking twist: people who expect to climb the income ladder may oppose redistribution even when currently poor, because they anticipate being net payers tomorrow. A third strand emphasizes beliefs about fairness — whether success reflects effort or luck. The empirical method is an individual-level survey regression, typically ordered logit or multilevel, of redistribution attitudes on income, mobility expectations, beliefs, and contextual factors.
Key highlights
- Brings individual-level micro evidence to bear on macro theories of redistribution, testing the self-interest, mobility, and fairness channels jointly.
- The ordered and multilevel structure respects the ordinal survey outcome and the nesting of individuals within societies.
- Helps resolve the empirical puzzle that aggregate demand for redistribution does not track inequality as the simple Meltzer-Richard logic predicts.
- Connects directly to rich, comparable international survey data, enabling cross-national tests of how context shapes preferences.
Intuition
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How it works
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When to use it
Use redistribution preference analysis when you have individual-level survey data on attitudes toward inequality and redistribution alongside measures of income, mobility expectations, beliefs, and demographics, and want to explain who supports redistribution and why. It suits questions about the micro-foundations of welfare-state support, the puzzle of why demand for redistribution does not rise mechanically with inequality, and cross-national differences in fairness beliefs. The method is most defensible when the income and mobility measures are well constructed, when the survey items match the theoretical construct, and when contextual variation is modeled with a multilevel structure rather than ignored. It is weaker when income is poorly measured or endogenous to attitudes, when mobility expectations are unobserved and proxied crudely, or when the cross-national sample is too small to estimate country-level effects, in which case the contextual claims are fragile.
Strengths & limitations
- Brings individual-level micro evidence to bear on macro theories of redistribution, testing the self-interest, mobility, and fairness channels jointly.
- The ordered and multilevel structure respects the ordinal survey outcome and the nesting of individuals within societies.
- Helps resolve the empirical puzzle that aggregate demand for redistribution does not track inequality as the simple Meltzer-Richard logic predicts.
- Connects directly to rich, comparable international survey data, enabling cross-national tests of how context shapes preferences.
- Survey attitudes are sensitive to question wording and framing, so measured 'preferences' may not correspond cleanly to the theoretical construct or to behavior.
- Mobility expectations and fairness beliefs are hard to measure and may themselves be endogenous to, or rationalizations of, the very preferences being explained.
- Cross-sectional data cannot establish that income or expectations cause attitudes rather than being correlated through unobserved values.
- Ordered-logit coefficients are not directly interpretable as magnitudes without computing marginal effects, and the parallel-regressions assumption may be violated.
Common pitfalls
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Applications
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Frequently asked
Why doesn't demand for redistribution rise with inequality as Meltzer-Richard predicts?
The simple Meltzer-Richard logic says the below-mean median voter should want more redistribution as inequality (the mean-to-median gap) widens, yet cross-national data show this relationship is weak or absent. Several mechanisms explain the gap: the prospect of upward mobility (POUM) leads some poor people to oppose redistribution they expect to fund later; beliefs that success reflects effort rather than luck dampen demand even where inequality is high; and the rich may have disproportionate political influence. Redistribution preference analysis tests these competing channels at the individual level to see which dampens the predicted inequality-demand link.
What exactly is the POUM hypothesis and how is it tested?
POUM — the prospect of upward mobility — is Benabou and Ok's idea that forward-looking individuals base redistribution preferences on expected future income, not just current income. Someone poor today but expecting to rise may oppose redistribution because they anticipate becoming a net payer, and under plausible conditions this holds even for the risk-averse. It is tested by including a measure of subjective or objective expected mobility in the individual-level regression and checking whether higher mobility expectations reduce support for redistribution among the currently poor, net of current income.
Why use ordered logit instead of ordinary least squares?
Redistribution attitudes are typically measured on ordered categorical scales — for instance, five points from strongly disagree to strongly agree. These categories are ranked but the distances between them are not meaningful numeric quantities, so treating them as a continuous variable in ordinary least squares can distort estimates and predict impossible values. Ordered logit (or probit) models the probability of falling in each category through threshold parameters, respecting the ordinal nature of the response; for cross-national data a multilevel ordered model additionally accounts for the nesting of individuals within countries.
Sources
- 1.Meltzer, A. H., & Richard, S. F. (1981). A Rational Theory of the Size of Government. Journal of Political Economy, 89(5), 914-927.
- 2.Benabou, R., & Ok, E. A. (2001). Social Mobility and the Demand for Redistribution: The POUM Hypothesis. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 116(2), 447-487.
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Cite this page
ScholarGate. (2026, June 22). Redistribution Preference Analysis. ScholarGate. https://scholargate.app/political-economy/redistribution-preference-analysis