Median Voter Model
The median voter model is a foundational result of political economy stating that, under majority rule with voters whose preferences are single-peaked on a single policy dimension, the ideal point of the median voter is the Condorcet winner — it cannot be beaten by any other alternative in pairwise majority voting. Duncan Black established the theorem formally in 1948, and Anthony Downs extended it in 1957 into a theory of party competition in which two vote-maximizing parties converge to the median voter's preferred policy. The model is the workhorse linking the distribution of citizen preferences to equilibrium policy outcomes in democracies.
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- Black, D. (1948). On the Rationale of Group Decision-making. Journal of Political Economy, 56(1), 23-34. · DOI 10.1086/256633
- Downs, A. (1957). An Economic Theory of Democracy. Harper & Row. · ISBN 9780060417505
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