Transaction Cost Economics Analysis
Transaction cost economics (TCE) analysis explains how firms should organize their economic exchanges -- whether to buy on the market, make in-house, or use a hybrid arrangement -- by minimizing the sum of production and transaction costs. Building on Coase's question of why firms exist, Oliver Williamson's 1979 article and 1985 book The Economic Institutions of Capitalism developed a comparative framework in which the efficient governance of a transaction depends on its attributes, above all asset specificity, together with uncertainty and frequency. Because human actors are boundedly rational and potentially opportunistic, contracts are inevitably incomplete; when a transaction requires investments specialized to a particular partner, those investments create quasi-rents that the partner can try to expropriate -- the hold-up problem. The central prescription, the discriminating-alignment hypothesis, is to match each transaction to the governance structure -- market, hybrid, or hierarchy -- that economizes on these transaction costs, making the make-or-buy decision a question of comparative institutional efficiency.
Bronrecord
Citaten letterlijk overgenomen uit het bronrecord van de methode. Hieruit wordt geen verificatie op claimniveau afgeleid.
- Williamson, O. E. (1985). The Economic Institutions of Capitalism: Firms, Markets, Relational Contracting. New York: Free Press. · ISBN 9780029348208
- Williamson, O. E. (1979). Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations. Journal of Law and Economics, 22(2), 233-261. · DOI 10.1086/466942
Gecureerde claims
Claims opgeslagen in het bewijsregister, elk met zijn eigen beoordeling.
Deze weergave verzint geen claimbeoordeling als het register er geen heeft.
Gerelateerde methoden
Gegenereerd uit de methodegraaf en getoond als machinaal voorgestelde relaties — er wordt geen bewijsclaim afgeleid.