Catatan bukti metode

Deterrence Modeling

Deterrence modeling uses game theory to analyze when a defender can dissuade a challenger from aggression by threatening unacceptable costs. Classical deterrence theory, rooted in Schelling's work and Cold War nuclear strategy, was reformulated by Frank Zagare and D. Marc Kilgour in Perfect Deterrence (2000) into a family of incomplete-information games. These models make precise the two requirements a deterrent threat must meet — capability (the means to inflict the cost) and credibility (a genuine willingness to carry it out) — and identify the equilibrium conditions under which deterrence succeeds, fails, or collapses into conflict.

Sources recorded, not reviewed

Catatan sumber

Kutipan disalin apa adanya dari catatan sumber metode. Tidak ada verifikasi tingkat klaim yang disimpulkan darinya.

Game-Theoretic Modeling of Deterrence in International Relations

Catatan metode taksonomi · mcdm / international-relations

Zagare, F. C., & Kilgour, D. M. (2000). Perfect Deterrence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. · ISBN 9780521781749

Buka metode lengkap

Klaim yang dikurasi

Klaim tersimpan dalam buku besar bukti, masing-masing dengan penilaiannya sendiri.

Belum ada klaim yang dikurasi

Tampilan ini tidak menciptakan penilaian klaim ketika buku besar tidak memilikinya.

Metode terkait

Dihasilkan dari grafik metode dan ditampilkan sebagai relasi yang disarankan mesin — tidak ada klaim bukti yang disimpulkan.

Same method familyBargaining Model of Warmachine-suggested · Relational suggestion, not evidence.Same method familyCrisis Bargaining Gamemachine-suggested · Relational suggestion, not evidence.Same method familyRichardson Arms Race Modelmachine-suggested · Relational suggestion, not evidence.