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Principal-Agent Analysis in the Public Sector

Principal-agent analysis in the public sector applies agency theory to the chains of delegation that run through government — from voters to legislators, legislators to executives, and executives to bureaucracies. Terry Moe's 1984 article The New Economics of Organization brought this institutional-economics lens into the study of public bureaucracy, asking how political principals can control agents who have their own interests and superior information. The method identifies the principal and agent, specifies how their goals diverge, characterises the information asymmetry between them, and examines the control mechanisms principals use to limit agency losses. Its purpose is to explain bureaucratic behaviour and the design of oversight as the predictable result of delegation under conflicting incentives.

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Principal-Agent Analysis of Public-Sector Delegation

Taksonoomiline meetodikirje · process-pipeline / public-administration

Moe, T. M. (1984). The New Economics of Organization. American Journal of Political Science, 28(4), 739–777. · DOI 10.2307/2110997

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Same method familyAccountability Mechanism Analysismachine-suggested · Relational suggestion, not evidence.Same method familyPolicy Implementation Analysismachine-suggested · Relational suggestion, not evidence.See alsoPrincipal-Agent Modelmachine-suggested · Relational suggestion, not evidence.Same method familyTransaction Cost Analysis in the Public Sectormachine-suggested · Relational suggestion, not evidence.