Registro de evidencia del método

Deterrence Modeling

Deterrence modeling uses game theory to analyze when a defender can dissuade a challenger from aggression by threatening unacceptable costs. Classical deterrence theory, rooted in Schelling's work and Cold War nuclear strategy, was reformulated by Frank Zagare and D. Marc Kilgour in Perfect Deterrence (2000) into a family of incomplete-information games. These models make precise the two requirements a deterrent threat must meet — capability (the means to inflict the cost) and credibility (a genuine willingness to carry it out) — and identify the equilibrium conditions under which deterrence succeeds, fails, or collapses into conflict.

Sources recorded, not reviewed

Registro de origen

Citas copiadas textualmente del registro de origen del método. No se infiere ninguna verificación a nivel de afirmación de ellas.

Game-Theoretic Modeling of Deterrence in International Relations

Registro del método taxonómico · mcdm / international-relations

Zagare, F. C., & Kilgour, D. M. (2000). Perfect Deterrence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. · ISBN 9780521781749

Abrir método completo

Afirmaciones curadas

Afirmaciones persistidas en el libro mayor de evidencia, cada una con su propia evaluación.

Aún no hay afirmaciones curadas

Esta vista no inventa una evaluación de afirmación si el libro mayor no tiene ninguna.

Métodos relacionados

Generado a partir del grafo de métodos y mostrado como relaciones sugeridas por la máquina; no se infiere ninguna afirmación de evidencia.

Same method familyBargaining Model of Warmachine-suggested · Relational suggestion, not evidence.Same method familyCrisis Bargaining Gamemachine-suggested · Relational suggestion, not evidence.Same method familyRichardson Arms Race Modelmachine-suggested · Relational suggestion, not evidence.