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Crisis Bargaining Game

A crisis bargaining game is a formal, usually extensive-form model in which two states sequentially choose to challenge, escalate, stand firm, or back down during an international dispute, and the analyst solves for the equilibrium pattern of escalation and concession. Building on Schelling's strategy of conflict and given an influential treatment in Fearon's (1994) model of escalation as a war of attrition, these games make explicit how incomplete information about each side's resolve, and the costs each pays for backing down, shape whether a crisis ends in mutual accommodation, capitulation, or war.

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Game-Theoretic Models of International Crisis Bargaining

Registro del método taxonómico · mcdm / international-relations

Fearon, J. D. (1994). Domestic political audiences and the escalation of international disputes. American Political Science Review, 88(3), 577–592. · DOI 10.2307/2944796

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Métodos relacionados

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Taxonomic bucketAudience Cost Analysismachine-suggested · Relational suggestion, not evidence.Taxonomic bucketBargaining Model of Warmachine-suggested · Relational suggestion, not evidence.Same method familyDeterrence Modelingmachine-suggested · Relational suggestion, not evidence.