Σύγκριση μεθόδων

	Τέλειο Ισορροπία Υποπαιγνίου	Ανταγωνισμός Stackelberg
Πεδίο	Θεωρία Παιγνίων	Θεωρία Παιγνίων
Οικογένεια	Machine learning	Machine learning
Έτος προέλευσης	1965	1934
Δημιουργός	Reinhard Selten	Heinrich von Stackelberg
Τύπος	algorithm	algorithm
Θεμελιώδης πηγή	Selten, R. (1965). Spieltheoretische Behandlung eines Oligopolmodells mit Nachfrageträgheit. Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft, 121, 301-324.	von Stackelberg, H. (1934). Marktform und Gleichgewicht. Julius Springer.
Εναλλακτικές ονομασίες	Backward Induction, Sequential Equilibrium, Extensive-Form Equilibrium	Quantity Leadership, Sequential Oligopoly, Stackelberg Equilibrium
Συναφείς	4	4
Σύνοψη	Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (SPE) is a refinement of Nash Equilibrium for sequential games, introduced by Reinhard Selten in 1965. It requires that strategy profiles constitute a Nash Equilibrium in every subgame, eliminating non-credible threats and incredible promises. Backward induction is the primary computational method for finding SPE in finite games.	Stackelberg Competition models sequential oligopolistic markets where one firm (the leader) commits to a quantity first, and other firms (followers) observe this choice and respond. Introduced by Heinrich von Stackelberg in 1934, the model captures first-mover advantage in quantity-setting competition. The resulting Stackelberg Equilibrium, found by backward induction, yields the leader higher profit than simultaneous (Cournot) competition.