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Voting Power Index Analysis×Two-Level Game Analysis×
ΠεδίοPolitical SciencePolitical Science
ΟικογένειαMCDMMCDM
Έτος προέλευσης19541988
ΔημιουργόςLloyd Shapley & Martin Shubik; John F. Banzhaf IIIRobert D. Putnam
ΤύποςCooperative game-theoretic measure of a priori voting powerFramework for analyzing international negotiation under domestic constraints
Θεμελιώδης πηγήShapley, L. S., & Shubik, M. (1954). A Method for Evaluating the Distribution of Power in a Committee System. American Political Science Review, 48(3), 787-792. DOI ↗Putnam, R. D. (1988). Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games. International Organization, 42(3), 427-460. DOI ↗
Εναλλακτικές ονομασίεςVoting Power Index, Shapley-Shubik Index, Banzhaf Power Index, A Priori Voting Power AnalysisTwo-Level Games, Putnam Two-Level Game Framework, Win-Set Analysis, Double-Edged Diplomacy
Συναφείς44
ΣύνοψηVoting power index analysis measures the a priori capacity of each member of a weighted voting body to influence collective decisions, defined as the probability that the member is pivotal — that their vote turns a losing coalition into a winning one. The two canonical indices are the Shapley-Shubik index, introduced by Lloyd Shapley and Martin Shubik in 1954 as a specialization of the Shapley value to simple voting games, and the Banzhaf index, formalized by John Banzhaf in 1965. Both reveal that a player's share of power generally differs sharply from its share of votes.Two-level game analysis is a framework introduced by Robert Putnam in 1988 for understanding how international negotiations are jointly shaped by bargaining between governments and the need to win domestic approval. A negotiator plays simultaneously at two tables: Level I, where states bargain over an agreement, and Level II, where that agreement must be ratified by domestic constituents. The key analytic device is the win-set — the set of Level I deals that could secure domestic ratification — and an agreement is possible only where the negotiating states' win-sets overlap.
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ScholarGateΣύγκριση μεθόδων: Voting Power Index Analysis · Two-Level Game Analysis. Ανακτήθηκε στις 2026-06-24 από https://scholargate.app/el/compare