Σύγκριση μεθόδων

	Voting Power Index Analysis	Αξία Shapley
Πεδίο	Political Science	Θεωρία Παιγνίων
Οικογένεια	MCDM	Machine learning
Έτος προέλευσης	1954	1953
Δημιουργός	Lloyd Shapley & Martin Shubik; John F. Banzhaf III	Lloyd Shapley
Τύπος	Cooperative game-theoretic measure of a priori voting power	algorithm
Θεμελιώδης πηγή	Shapley, L. S., & Shubik, M. (1954). A Method for Evaluating the Distribution of Power in a Committee System. American Political Science Review, 48(3), 787-792.	Shapley, L. S. (1953). A value for n-person games. In H. W. Kuhn & A. W. Tucker (Eds.), Contributions to the Theory of Games II (pp. 307-317). Princeton University Press.
Εναλλακτικές ονομασίες	Voting Power Index, Shapley-Shubik Index, Banzhaf Power Index, A Priori Voting Power Analysis	Fair Division, Cooperative Game Solution, Dividend Vector
Συναφείς	4	4
Σύνοψη	Voting power index analysis measures the a priori capacity of each member of a weighted voting body to influence collective decisions, defined as the probability that the member is pivotal — that their vote turns a losing coalition into a winning one. The two canonical indices are the Shapley-Shubik index, introduced by Lloyd Shapley and Martin Shubik in 1954 as a specialization of the Shapley value to simple voting games, and the Banzhaf index, formalized by John Banzhaf in 1965. Both reveal that a player's share of power generally differs sharply from its share of votes.	The Shapley Value is a solution concept for coalition games that distributes total payoff fairly among players based on their marginal contributions to coalitions. Introduced by Lloyd Shapley in 1953, the Shapley Value is the unique payoff distribution that satisfies four intuitive axioms: efficiency (total payoff is distributed), symmetry (identical players receive equal payoff), null player (players contributing nothing receive nothing), and additivity across games.