Σύγκριση μεθόδων

	Ισορροπία Nash	Τέλειο Ισορροπία Υποπαιγνίου
Πεδίο	Θεωρία Παιγνίων	Θεωρία Παιγνίων
Οικογένεια	Machine learning	Machine learning
Έτος προέλευσης	1950	1965
Δημιουργός	John Nash	Reinhard Selten
Τύπος	algorithm	algorithm
Θεμελιώδης πηγή	Nash, J. F. (1950). Equilibrium points in N-person games. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 36(1), 48-49.	Selten, R. (1965). Spieltheoretische Behandlung eines Oligopolmodells mit Nachfrageträgheit. Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft, 121, 301-324.
Εναλλακτικές ονομασίες	Lemke-Howson Equilibrium, Completely Labeled Pair	Backward Induction, Sequential Equilibrium, Extensive-Form Equilibrium
Συναφείς	4	4
Σύνοψη	Nash Equilibrium is a game-theoretic solution concept where no player can unilaterally deviate to improve their payoff. Formalized by John Nash in 1950, the Lemke-Howson algorithm computationally finds equilibria in bimatrix games by identifying completely labeled vertex pairs in the strategy polytopes.	Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (SPE) is a refinement of Nash Equilibrium for sequential games, introduced by Reinhard Selten in 1965. It requires that strategy profiles constitute a Nash Equilibrium in every subgame, eliminating non-credible threats and incredible promises. Backward induction is the primary computational method for finding SPE in finite games.