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Median Voter Model×Veto Player Analysis×
ΠεδίοPolitical EconomyPolitical Science
ΟικογένειαMCDMMCDM
Έτος προέλευσης19481995
ΔημιουργόςDuncan Black & Anthony DownsGeorge Tsebelis
ΤύποςFormal model of electoral competitionComparative institutional analysis framework
Θεμελιώδης πηγήBlack, D. (1948). On the Rationale of Group Decision-making. Journal of Political Economy, 56(1), 23-34. DOI ↗Tsebelis, G. (2002). Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work. Princeton University Press. ISBN: 9780691091891
Εναλλακτικές ονομασίεςMedian Voter Theorem, Black's Median Voter Theorem, Downsian Median Voter Model, Median Voter EquilibriumVeto Players Theory, Veto Points Analysis, Tsebelis Veto Player Framework, Policy Stability Analysis
Συναφείς44
ΣύνοψηThe median voter model is a foundational result of political economy stating that, under majority rule with voters whose preferences are single-peaked on a single policy dimension, the ideal point of the median voter is the Condorcet winner — it cannot be beaten by any other alternative in pairwise majority voting. Duncan Black established the theorem formally in 1948, and Anthony Downs extended it in 1957 into a theory of party competition in which two vote-maximizing parties converge to the median voter's preferred policy. The model is the workhorse linking the distribution of citizen preferences to equilibrium policy outcomes in democracies.Veto player analysis is a spatial-institutional framework, developed by George Tsebelis in his 1995 article and 2002 book, for predicting the capacity of a political system to change policy. A veto player is any individual or collective actor whose agreement is required to alter the status quo. The theory shows that the potential for policy change shrinks as the number of veto players grows, as the ideological distance between them widens, and as their internal cohesion increases — three structural variables that together determine a system's policy stability independently of constitutional labels such as presidentialism or parliamentarism.
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ScholarGateΣύγκριση μεθόδων: Median Voter Model · Veto Player Analysis. Ανακτήθηκε στις 2026-06-25 από https://scholargate.app/el/compare