Σύγκριση μεθόδων

	Dyadic Conflict Analysis	Democratic Peace Analysis
Πεδίο	International Relations	International Relations
Οικογένεια	Process / pipeline	Process / pipeline
Έτος προέλευσης	1992	1993
Δημιουργός	Stuart A. Bremer (and the Correlates of War dyadic tradition)	Zeev Maoz & Bruce Russett (and the broader democratic-peace literature)
Τύπος	Observational research design for interstate conflict	Observational dyadic test of the regime-type/conflict relationship
Θεμελιώδης πηγή	Bremer, S. A. (1992). Dangerous dyads: Conditions affecting the likelihood of interstate war, 1816–1965. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 36(2), 309–341.	Maoz, Z., & Russett, B. (1993). Normative and structural causes of democratic peace, 1946–1986. American Political Science Review, 87(3), 624–638.
Εναλλακτικές ονομασίες	Dyad-Year Analysis, Dyadic Design in Conflict Studies, Dangerous Dyads Analysis, Pairwise Interstate Conflict Analysis	Democratic Peace Theory Testing, Dyadic Democratic Peace Analysis, Joint Democracy and Conflict Analysis, Liberal Peace Analysis
Συναφείς	3	3
Σύνοψη	Dyadic conflict analysis is the dominant research design in quantitative conflict studies: it treats the pair of states (the dyad), observed year by year, as the unit of analysis and models the probability that a pair experiences militarized conflict as a function of their joint and individual attributes. Stuart Bremer's 'Dangerous Dyads' (1992) is the canonical statement, identifying which conditions — contiguity, the absence of alliance, power parity, the absence of joint democracy, and others — make a pair of states war-prone. The design aligns conflict data with the relational theories that dominate the field.	Democratic peace analysis is the empirical study of the proposition that democracies rarely or never fight one another. Building on the dyadic research design crystallized by Maoz and Russett (1993), it codes the regime type of each state, constructs dyad-years, and models the probability of militarized conflict as a function of joint democracy alongside controls for power, contiguity, alliances, and trade. The approach has produced one of the most robust empirical regularities in international relations and a long debate over whether shared norms or institutional structures account for it.