Σύγκριση μεθόδων

	Counterfactual Analysis	Bargaining Model of War
Πεδίο	International Relations	International Relations
Οικογένεια	Process / pipeline	MCDM
Έτος προέλευσης	1991	1995
Δημιουργός	James Fearon (methodological treatment); Tetlock & Belkin (framework)	James D. Fearon
Τύπος	Method of causal reasoning via hypothetical alternatives	Formal model of war as bargaining failure
Θεμελιώδης πηγή	Fearon, J. D. (1991). Counterfactuals and hypothesis testing in political science. World Politics, 43(2), 169–195.	Fearon, J. D. (1995). Rationalist explanations for war. International Organization, 49(3), 379–414.
Εναλλακτικές ονομασίες	Counterfactual Reasoning in IR, What-If Analysis in International Relations, Counterfactual Thought Experiments, Hypothetical Case Analysis	Rationalist Explanations for War, Bargaining Theory of War, Crisis Bargaining Model, Fearon Bargaining Model
Συναφείς	3	3
Σύνοψη	Counterfactual analysis evaluates causal claims in international relations by reasoning about what would have happened had some antecedent been different: had the archduke not been assassinated, had the United States not deployed missiles, had a leader chosen otherwise. As Fearon (1991) argues, such counterfactuals play a necessary if often implicit role in testing hypotheses about singular and small-N events, where ordinary statistical comparison is impossible. Done rigorously — with plausible antecedents, sound connecting principles, and attention to confounders — counterfactual analysis disciplines the 'what if' reasoning that pervades historical and conflict explanation.	The bargaining model of war, given its canonical statement by James Fearon in 'Rationalist Explanations for War' (1995), treats war not as the failure of reason but as a failure of bargaining. Because fighting is costly and uncertain, there almost always exists a peaceful division of the disputed stakes that both rational states would prefer to the gamble of war. The puzzle, and the model's central contribution, is to identify the specific conditions — private information with incentives to misrepresent, commitment problems, and issue indivisibility — under which rational, unitary states nonetheless fail to reach such a settlement.